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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ITS HISTORY, RATIONALE
AND FUTURE
Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy for life or limb.'
The effectiveness of this utilitarian maxim protecting an in-
dividual from multiple punishment for the commission of a single
offsnse is limited by legal fictions, anomalies and sophisticated dis-
tinctions.2  This Comment analyzes some important double jeo-
pardy problems and forecasts the handling of these controversial
areas in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions.
DUE PROCESS.
During the past few years, the United States Supreme Court
has reevaluated its position on the application to the states of the
Bill of Rights.8 The Court has found it imperative in many situa-
tions expressly to overrule prior decisions in an effort to extend
constitutional protections to individuals. 4 Whether this emerging
liberal approach to criminal procedure will be extended to encom-
pass the double jeopardy provision is worthy of consideration.
In 1937 the Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut5 held that
1. U.S. CONST. amend V. The referral to the antiquated jeopardy of
limb has been held to signify felonies, Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick.
496 (Mass. 1832); People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns 187 (N.Y. 1820), but the
doctrine is also applied to misdemeanors. Ex parte Lange, 18 U.S. 163
(1873).
2. Even the Supreme Court in 1873 thought the double jeopardy pro-
vision to be an undecided defense. It stated in Ex parte Lange, 18 U.S.
163 (1873): "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England
and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the
same offense." Id. at 168. The Court obviously did not envision the
numerous problems created by the courts in interpreting this clause.
3. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (judge commenting on defend-
ant failure to testify); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (compelled
self-incrimination); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to
'counsel during interrogation). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to trial counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel
and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (unreason-
able search and seizure).
4. Pointer v. Texas, supra note 3, overruled West v. Louisiana, 194
U.S. 258 (1904); Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 3, overruled Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 3, overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942); Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 3, overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).5. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that the purpose
of the Court's holding was to allow Connecticut a retrial in an effort to
correct errors and was not permitting a relitigation of the trial after a
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the double jeopardy prohibition was not applicable to state proceed-
ings. The defendant in Palko, although indicted for first degree
murder, was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The State appealed 6 and the highest court of
Connecticut reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. The
jury in the second trial returned a death sentence verdict of murder
in the first degree despite the defendant's objection of having been
subjected to double jeopardy. On appeal the United States Su-
preme Court phrased the issue: "Does it [double jeopardy] violate
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions? ' 7 After surveying
the various cases imposing provisions of the Bill of Rights upon the
states, the Court concluded that double jeopardy was not one of
these fundamental principles to be extended to the states.
The decisions relied upon by the Palko Court have been either
seriously undermined or expressly overruled by the Supreme
Court in recent years." Prior to Palko the Court in Twining v.
New Jersey9 had refused to extend the fifth amendment guarantee
against compulsory self-incrimination to the states. Consequently,
the Palko Court was moved not to apply the double jeopardy pro-
hibition to the states. The Twining issue was reconsidered in 1964
by the Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan.10 The Malloy Court
abandoned the Twining rationale ruling that the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits state infringement on the privilege against self-
incrimination just as the fifth amendment prevents the federal
government from denying the privilege. The Palko Court also re-
ferred to West v. Louisiana" on which the sixth amendment right
to confrontation of witnesses was held not applicable in state pro-
ceedings. Re-examining this issue in 1965, the Court in Pointer v.
trial free from error. Nevertheless, the language of the opinion obviously
dealt with the extension of the double jeopardy provision upon the states.
6. CoNr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54.96 (1960) "Appeals from the rulings
and decisions of the superior court or of the court of common pleas, upon
all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases, may be taken
by the state, with the permission of the presiding judge, to the supreme
court of errors, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made by
the accused."
7. 302 U.S. at 328.
8. The right to a trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution
except as the result of an indictment are arguments advanced in Palko
which have not been overruled or circumvented by the Supreme Court.
The Palko Court relied on Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), for
the application to the states of the fourth amendment. This decision, how-
ever, dealt exclusively with the federal courts. When a similar argument,
i.e., excluding evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure,
was discussed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court concluded
that the rule should be extended to the states.
9. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
10. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
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Texas12 expressly overruled West. The Pointer Court placed great
emphasis on Gideon v. Wainwright13 which imposed the sixth
amendment right to counsel provision on the states. If the Su-
preme Court were confronted with a Palko fact situation today, it
could parallel the reasoning used in Pointer that in view of Malloy
v. Hogan, now extending part of the fifth amendment upon the
states, Palko should no longer be considered the law.'
4
The Palko Court admitted that the dividing line appeared to be
wavering, but in the final analysis more cases did not extend fed-
eral amendments to the states. If this reasoning were used today,
the Court would reach an opposite result. With the weight of au-
thority now shifted and with part of the fifth amendment now
applicable to the states, the application of the double jeopardy
clause upon the states should be reconsidered. There are three
possibilities open to the Court: Refuse to extend the double jeo-
pardy provision to the states as done in Palko; rule that the fifth
amendment prohibits double jeopardy in the states through the
fourteenth amendment by overruling Palko; or, hold that the dou-
ble jeopardy provision is imposed on the states for it is violative
of the fourteenth amendment's due process of law provision."
In attempting to foresee how the Palko issue would be decided
today, an analysis of recent cases reveals guidelines used by the
Court in ascertaining whether a provision of the Bill of Rights
should be extended to the states. One standard imbued in all of
the recent cases and even considered in Palko is: Are the rights
protected by the amendment in question among those "fundamen-
tal principles of liberty and justice which are at the base of all our
civil and political institutions."'1 6 The application of this standard
12. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. It should be noted that Justices Black and Douglas who concurred
in the decision written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko have now firmly
expressed their disagreement with the decision. They state that "double
prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free
country that they violate even the prevailing view of the fourteenth
amendment, expressed in Palko v. Connecticut." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 151 (1959).
15. The Court could ignore the fifth amendment and look exclusively
to the fact situation to ascertain whether the second trial shocks the con-
science of the Court. This procedure was employed in Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which state officials had information that
petitioner was selling narcotics. The agents forced their way into peti-
tioner's bedroom and discovered two capsules lying on a table. Petitioner
swallowed the capsules and the agents took him against his will to a
hospital where his stomach was pumped. He vomited two capsules con-
taining morphine. These were admitted in evidence over his objection
and he was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the decision because
the evidence was obtained by methods violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
16. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1935); Snyder v. Mass-




is dependent on the reaction of the Supreme Court as evidenced
by the varying conclusions reached by the Court in applying this
standard.
In 1949 the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado17 held that the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and sei-
zure was not forbidden in a state court prosecution. The Court did
not consider the exclusionary rule essential to the right of privacy.
Only twelve years later, Mapp v. Ohio 8 expressly overruled Wolf.
It held all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution inadmissible in a state court. The Court applied
the same standard as Wolf, but in 1961 it "was logically and con-
stitutionally necessary that the exclusionary doctrine-an essential
part of the right of privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient. .. 19
An analogous situation exists in the right to counsel cases. In
Betts v. Brady20 the Court held that the lower court's refusal to
appoint counsel under the particular case at issue was not so "of-
fensive to the common and fundamental idea of fairness"21 as to
amount to a denial of due process. In 1962 the Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright,22 a case similar to Betts, agreed with Betts'
basic premise that provisions of the Constitution which are "funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial" are made obligatory upon the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The Court, however, dis-
agreed with Betts in its conclusion that the sixth amendment guar-
antee of right to counsel is not such a fundamental right.
23
The historical development of a right or liberty is helpful to
determine whether it is fundamental to our judicial system. The
doctrine of double jeopardy may be found in the common law as
early as 125024 and in the Spanish Fuero Real of 1255.25 By the
thirteenth century England recognized double jeopardy as a uni-
17. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Id. at 648.
20. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
21. Id. at 463.
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. The reasons advanced for the Court's change in interpretation of
this standard are many. One argument is that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
the only Justice still sitting who had joined the majority in Betts v. Brady,
retired from the bench in April 1962. Another reason is that the "special
circumstances" test of Betts v. Brady was riddled with numerous excep-
tions and not workable. A third reason is that at the time of Gideon
thirty-seven states expressly provided for appointment of counsel in felony
cases; consequently, the Court was not concerned with the problem of
intruding upon states rights. Finally, the Court was convinced that an
accused needed the assistance of a trained counsel to receive a fair trial.
See Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 39 NoTRE DAME LAW 150 (1964).
24. 1 STAUND. P.C. 106.
25. Lib. IV, tit. XXI, pp. 1, 13, cited in Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 120, 121 (1924).
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versal maxim of the common law.26 It was not unusual, therefore,
that the doctrine was brought to America by the early settlers as
part of their laws. By the time of the American Revolution and the
early days under the Constitution, 27 there seemed to be a tendency
that a trial in a court of another nation or state would bar a prose-
cution.28  Today, such a provision appears in the Federal Consti-
tution, in all but five state constitutions 29 and in the criminal pro-
cedure of most foreign nations.3 0
There are numerous reasons for the prohibition against an in-
dividual being tried twice for engaging in the same criminal con-
duct. Although the rules of double jeopardy and res judicata are
26. The first case in which the subject arose, The King v. Thomas, 1
Sid. 179, 82 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1662) concerned a prosecution for murder
under a 1534 statute which provided that the neighboring English country
had jurisdiction over felonies committed in Wales. The defendant who
had been acquitted by the Welsh tribunal contended that "Wales are to
have the same immunities as English born, who on acquittal cannot be
tried again." The case was referred to the Kings Bench by the assize
court and it was resolved that the defendant should be discharged.
The next and leading case, The King v. Hutchinson, was unreported
except for references to it in the reports of other cases. See The King v.
Roche, 1 Leach 134, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B. 1775). The facts as they
come from the reports of other cases indicate that the defendant killed
a man in Portugal and was acquitted by that sovereignty. Upon his return
to England, he was apprehended and brought before the King's Bench. He
produced an exemplification of the record of the acquittal in Portugal and
the court stated that he could not be tried again for the same act in
England.
In the twelfth century avoidance of double punishment was a
major element in the celebrated controversey between St. Thomas
Becket and King Henry II. Henry wanted clerics who had been
convicted of crimes in church courts turned over to lay tribunals
for their punishment. Whether Becket was in fact correct in his
assertions that Henry's proposal would result in double punish-
ment for the clerics has been much debated by historians.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.5 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
27. The Body of Liberties of Massachusetts (1641), clause 42 reads:
"No man shall be twice sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same
crime, offence, or Trespasse." The pleas of former conviction and acquittal
were recognized in colonial Virginia. ScoTw, CRVMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL
VIRGINIA, 81-82, 102.
28. In State v. Antonio, 3 Brev. 562 (S.C. 1816) it was stated:
As to the second objection, 'A man may be twice tried' this
could not possibly happen. First, because it is the established
comitas gentium, and it is not infrequently brought into practice
to discharge one accused of a crime, who has been tried by a court
of competent jurisdiction. If this prevails among nations who are
strangers to each other, could it fail to be excused with us who
are so intimately bound by political ties.
Id. at 564.
29. Only five states retain the common law rule in its pure form as
interpreted by judicial decision. See State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829);
Gilpen v. State, 142 Md. 464, 131 Atl. 354 (1924); Commonwealth v. McCan,
277 Mass. 199, 178 N.E. 633 (1931); State v. Clemons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.E.
760 (1934); State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1937).
30. Batchelder, Former Jeopardy, 17 AM. L. REv. 735 (1882).
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distinguishable, it is the principle of res judicata that gives sub-
stance to the defense of double jeopardy.31 Mr. Justice Holmes
described the application of res judicata in civil cases as a funda-
mental principle of justice 2 demanding that an adjudication be con-
sidered final and binding between the same parties where the same
question arises.3 3 This fundamental principle is infinitely more es-
sential in criminal trials than in civil suits. The overpowering re-
sources of the prosecutor, the stigma inherent in defending against
a criminal action, the threat to freedom making the anxiety of re-
peated prosecution greater than in a civil suit,3 4 the realization that
if a state can try the issue before enough juries, conviction is almost
inevitable,35 and the unnecessary costs and vexations of repeated
trials36 are cogent reasons for regarding double jeopardy a funda-
mental principle of justice.
Another guideline extracted from some of the recent Supreme
Court decisions as to the application of a Bill of Rights provision
upon the states is: How would federal courts determine the ques-
tion at issue? The Court in Malloy v. Hogan3 7 defined this guide-
line:
It would be incongruous to have different standards deter-
mine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same
feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was
asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same
standards must determine whether an accused's silence in
either a federal or state proceeding is justified. 8
The Court in Mapp v. Ohio39 felt that the success of federalism de-
31. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 62, comment f (1942), in dealing with
res judicata, states:
Where there are a number of successive acts which are substan-
tially simultaneous or which, although occurring over a consider-
able period of time, are all substantially of the same sort, public
convenience and fairness to the defendant may require that they
be dealt with in one proceeding. Thus, where in a series of
rapidly successive acts a person breaks into the house of another,
beats him and takes his chattels, a judgment based upon a claim
for any one of these harms is a bar to a subsequent action.
32. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1915).
33. Harding v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N.E. 152 (1933).
34. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA
L. REV. 317 (1953).
35. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
36. Double jeopardy is calculated to protect individuals from "the
unnecessary costs and vexations of repeated trials," and to protect an in-
nocent person from the risk "of an erroneous conviction from repeated
trials." State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 370-71 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
37. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. Id. at 11.
39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In 1914, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), the Court for the first time held that in a federal prosecution the
fourth amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search and seizure. This decision was a matter of judicial implication and
not derived from explicit requirements of the fourth amendment. Relying
on Weeks, the Mapp Court stated:
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pended on the avoidance of needless conflict between state and
federal courts.
Reference should be made to the recent case of Green v. United
States.40 Green was tried for first degree murder in a federal court.
The jury returned a guilty verdict of second degree murder men-
tioning nothing about first degree murder. On appeal, his convic-
tion was reversed and remanded for a new trial. At the second
trial after his defense of former jeopardy was rejected, Green was
convicted of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Court held
that Green's second trial for first degree murder placed him in
jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. The conviction was reversed. If the present Supreme
Court were to give serious consideration to the federal-state coop-
eration standard alluded to in recent cases, it would probably
overrule Palko v. Connecticut in light of the federal approach es-
poused in Green.
The federal approach as espoused in Green and the recent ab-
sorbtion by the fourteenth amendment of certain fundamental
guarantees of the Bill of Rights led the court of appeals in United
States v. Wilkins41 to distinguish Palko.42 The court said that this
case differs from Palko and other similar decisions on the ground
that the Supreme Court has not decided whether the double jeop-
ardy guarantee should have applied to it the doctrine of selective
incorporation under which certain federal guarantees are absorbed
by the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, made applicable to
the states. Defendant in Wilkins was tried in a state court for the
murder of his wife and found guilty by the jury of second degree
murder. On appeal the court unanimously reversed the judgment
because of error in the judge's charge to the jury.43 Defendant
was tried again under the same indictment charging first degree
murder. This time the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree and sentenced to death. The conduct of and
statements made by the district attorney at the trial caused the
court on appeal to reverse the judgment of conviction.4 4 At the
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence
illegally seized, but a State's attorney across the street may, al-
though he supposedly is operating under the enforceable -prohibi-
tions of the same Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting evi-
dence unlawfully, seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the
Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold.
367 U.S. at 657.
40. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
41. 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965).
42. The dissent was of the opinion that Wilkins overruled Palko and
several other long standing Supreme Court decisions and that such action
is only within the province of that Court.
43. 277 App. Div. -310, 98 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1950). The State appealed
from this reversal but the order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
New York, 301 N.Y. 757, 95 N.E.2d 819 (1950).
44. 304 N.Y. 80, 106 N.E.2d 20 (1952). The district attorney made
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third trial and with the use of the same indictment, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder and senten-
ced defendant to prison for forty years to life.45 On a writ of habeas
corpus the circuit court held that the state transgressed the limi-
tations of reprosecution of an individual for the same offense im-
posed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The reasoning and rationale advanced by the Wilkins court would
be a strong and equitable foundation for the Supreme Court to use
in constructing its next double jeopardy decision in which state
reprosecution was involved. The federal view as to fact situations
different from Palko can be seen in the following discussion of
other double jeopardy problems when the federal courts have de-
cided cases concerning successive prosecution by different sover-
eignties, multiple crimes on a single occasion and the attachment
of jeopardy.
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION BY DnRENT SoVEREImNTIES
Successive prosecution by different sovereignties, i.e., where a
person is convicted or acquitted in a state court and then tried in a
federal court, is the most acute double jeopardy problem. The first
recorded indication that our two sovereign judicial processes posed
a double jeopardy problem was in 1820 in Houston v. Moore 46 where
a militia man refused to serve in the army. The Court was con-
fronted with deciding whether a person accused of committing a
federal offense could be requested to stand trial before a state
court martial. In questioning the state's jurisdiction, the Court
said:
It was contended, that if the exercise of this [state] juris-
diction, be admitted, that the sentence of the court would
either oust the jurisdiction of the United States court mar-
tial or might subject the accused to be twice tried for the
same offense. To this I answer, that, if the jurisdiction of
the two courts be concurrent, the sentence of either court,
either of conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of
the prosecution before the other. .... 47
repeated reference to defendant's failure to testify and to his religious
affiliations.
45. Decision affirmed, 282 App. Div. 1008, 125 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1953).
46. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1 (1820).
47. Id. at 4. In consanance with this reasoning is the following ex-
cerpt from the annals of Congress recording the proceedings on August 17,
1789 in which Congress rejected a specific amendment permitting succes-
sive prosecutions by federal and state governments:
The fifth clause of the fourth proposition was taken up, viz: 'No
person shall be subject, in cases of impeachment, to more than
one trial or one punishment for the same offence ... '
Mr. BENSON thought the committee could not agree to the
amendment in the manner it stood, because its meaning appeared
rather doubtful. It says that no person shall be tried more than
once for the same offense. This is contrary to the right heretofore
established; he presumed it was intended to express what was
[Vol. 70
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Permitting double jeopardy to be a defense in these situations
was short lived, for subsequent cases enunciated the concept of one
act being two wrongs-one against the state and the other against
the federal government. 48  The courts noted that the same crime
does not give rise to multiple punishment; rather, the single con-
duct constitutes two separate offenses.49 The Court combined the
two-sovereignties doctrine with the common law concept of a crime
as an offense against the sovereignty in United States v. Lanza.50
It was the first case to squarely hold that a federal prosecution
was not barred by defendant's previous conviction for violating a
state statute proscribing the identical act. The fifth amendment's
double jeopardy provision was limited to successive federal prose-
cutions.
secured by our former Constitution, that no man's life should be
more than once put in jeopardy for the same offense; yet it was
well known, that they were entitled to more than one trial. The
humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than one
punishment; for which reason he would move to amend it by
striking out the words 'one trial or . . .'
Mr. LIVERMORE thought the clause was essential; it was de-
claratory of the law as it now stood; striking out the words would
seem as if they meant to change the law by implication, and ex-
pose a man to the danger of more than one trial....
Mr. SEDGWICK thought, instead of securing the liberty of the
subject, it would be abridging the privileges of those who were
prosecuted.
The question on Mr. BENsoN's motion being put, was lost by
a considerable majority.
Mr. PARTRMIE moved to insert after 'same offence.' the words
'by any law of the United States.' This amendment was lost also.
1 ANNALs OF CONG. 753 (1789). (Emphasis added.)
48. In Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), the Court held that
even though there was a federal statute covering the same conduct, the
state still had a right to try the accused under the similar state statute.
The Court rejected defendant's argument that the fifth amendment would
prevent a subsequent federal trial and concluded that it was a state func-
tion and duty to punish a violator of its criminal statutes.
Conversely, the Court held in United States v. Marigold, 49 U.S. (9
How.) 560 (1850), that the federal government had the power to enforce
its criminal statutes even though the act also violated a state statute and
that a defendant might be punished under both laws.
49. The defendant in Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852),
the defendant was convicted of protecting an escaped slave in violation of
an Illinois statute. Argument was advanced that the statute was uncon-
stitutional because of a similar federal statute. The Court said that "by
one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly
punished." Id. at 14.
From the outset this view has been subject to vigorous dissent. Mr.
Justice McLean in Moore v. Illinois observed:
It is contrary to the nature and genius of our government, to
punish an individual twice for the same offense. Where the
jurisdiction is clearly vested in the federal government, and an
adequate punishment has been provided by it for an offense, no
state, it appears to me, can punish the same act.
Id. at 15.
50. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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The most recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with this
problem are Bartkus v. Illinois5l and Abbate v. United States.
52
In Bartkus petitioner was tried and acquitted in a federal court for
violation of a federal statute making it a crime to rob a federally
insured bank. On substantially the same evidence, he was later
tried and convicted in an Illinois court for violation of a com-
parable Illinois statute. The Court concluded that the state convic-
tion after a prior acquittal for a federal offense on substantially
the same evidence, did not violate the Constitution. In Abbate,
where the same problem in reverse was involved, the defendant
was convicted in an Illinois court for damaging a telephone line and
later convicted under a federal statute for the same act because
the line was used in transmitting United States Government mes-
sages. The Court held that the later federal prosecution was not
barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Given the Abbate decision which is historically justified and
not violative of the due process clause, it is futile to argue the
unconstitutionality of Bartkus. To permit the overruling of Bartkus
would be on the basis that the double jeopardy provision is obli-
gatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment which would
extend broader protection in this area than is provided for by the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. The imposition
of the due process clause in Bartkus is further hindered because
twenty-seven states have refused to rule that the second prosecu-
tion should be barred.53 To compel the states to bar the second
action would be inconsistent with the demands of federalism grant-
ing the states the right to prescribe their own court procedures.
Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Bartkus was of the view that the
majority apparently felt it less offensive to try a man twice for
the same offense if one of the trials is conducted in the federal
courts and the other in a state court. If double jeopardy is to be
avoided, certainly it hurts no less for two sovereignties to inflict it
than for one to inflict it twice. With two of the five Justices favor-
ing the Bartkus decision no longer on the Court 54 and in light of
the Supreme Court's emerging liberal view regarding the applica-
tion of the Bill of Rights upon the states55 a new approach to suc-
cessive prosecution cases is foreseeable.56 In the meantime, tem-
51. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
52. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
53. States that deny the bar are: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The only state raising
the bar is Florida.
54. Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker.
55. See cases cited note 3 supra.
56. For suggested solutions see Newman, Double Jeopardy and the




porary protection may be afforded by the Attorney General's policy
statement in 1959 declaring:
After a state prosecution there should be no federal
trial for the same act. . unless the reasons are compelling.
We should continue to make every effort to cooperate
with state and local authorities to the end that the trial oc-
cur in the jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where
the public interest is best served. If this be determined
accurately, and is followed by efficient and intelligent
cooperation of state and federal law enforcement authori-
ties, the consideration of a second prosecution very seldom
should arise.57
At least seventeen states have taken more effective steps by adopt-
ing statutes barring prosecution after a prior conviction or acquit-
tal in another jurisdiction. 58
MULTIPLE CRIMES ON A SINGLE OCCASION
The judicial application of the fifth amendment's prohibition
against multiple jeopardy for the same offense has given rise to the
vexing problem of defining what constitutes "the same offense."
The oldest and most widely used test to ascertain whether succes-
sive trials are in fact for the same offense is whether the evidence
necessary to sustain a second indictment would have been suffi-
cient to convict under the first.59 This "same evidence" test has
been a convenient vehicle whereby prosecutors may circumvent its
requirements by changing an insignificant fact or name on the in-
dictment. 60 Many states apparently disturbed by this impairment
of the double jeopardy defense applied what has been called the
"same transaction" test under which the plea of double jeopardy
will be sustained if two or more offenses were part of the same
57. Statement of Attorney General William P. Rogers, Press Release,
New York Times, April 6, 1959, p. 1, col. 4; Id. at p. 19, cols. 1, 2.
58. ALASKA STAT. § 66-3-4 (1949); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-146
(1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 656; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-315 (1949); ILL. REV.
STAT. c. 38 § 601.1 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-215 (1933); MINN. STAT.
§ 610.23 (1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2432 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 94-4703, -5617 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 2080, 20 (1960); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 33, and N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 139, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-0505, 29-0313
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 25, tit. 22. § 130 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. §
131.240(1) (1959); S.D. CODE §§ 13.0506, 34.0813 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-1-25, 77-8-8 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.43.040 (1951). See Model
Penal Code, § 1.11 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956.)
59. The test goes back to Rex v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 2 Leach 708,
168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796). See, Knowlton, Criminal Law and Procedure,
10 RuTGERS L. REV. 97 (1955).
60. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); Bacom v. Sulli-
van, 200 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1952); Coy v. United States, 5 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.
1925); Moorehead v. United States, 270 Fed. 210 (5th Cir. 1921); Kilpatrick
v. State, 257 Ala. 316, 59 S.2d 61 (1952); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17
S.E.2d 573 (1941); State v. Ciucci, 8 Ill.2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956), aff'd,
Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
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criminal transaction."1 The obvious deficiency in the application
of this test lies in the wide differences among state courts as to
what constitutes the same transaction.
62
It is apparent that the courts were faced with the problem of
achieving justice in a particular case regardless of the test applied.
Since there was no satisfactory test formulated to determine what
constitutes the same offense the Supreme Court in Hoag v. New
Jersey63 and Ciucci v. Illinois4 adopted the concept of "funda-
mental unfairness" in determining the constitutionality of consecu-
tive trials. In Hoag the issue was the identity of the accused who
simultaneously held up five customers in a tavern. Charged with
the robbery of three of the victims, Hoag was tried and acquitted
in a New Jersey Court. He was subsequently indicted, tried and
convicted for robbing a fourth victim on the same evidence used in
the prior trial. The Supreme Court observed that the fourteenth
amendment does not always forbid a state from prosecuting differ-
ent offenses at consecutive trials even though they arise out of the
same occurrence. The Court held, five to three with Mr. Justice
Brennan not participating, that the procedure used had not led to
fundamental unfairness. It went on to say: "Thus, whatever lim-
its may confine the right of a State to institute separate trials for
concededly different criminal offenses, it is plain to us that these
limits have not been transgressed in this case."65
Subsequently, in Ciucci, a five to four decision, the "funda-
mental unfairness" concept was again invoked. The defendant was
indicted for the murder of his wife and two children found in a
burning building with bullet holes in their heads. The husband
61. The states which generally follow the "same transaction" test are
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont and West Virginia. See, ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMvnN
LAw: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 29 (1935).
62. E.g., in Illinois the supreme court has ruled that manslaughter of
two persons in a single automobile accident is a multiple crime, whereas
in New Jersey it has been held a single offense. Compare People v. Allen,
368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1938), with State v. Cosgrove, 103 N.J.L. 412,
135 Atl. 871 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). The Illinois court classified the rob-
bery of several at one time as a single offense, whereas New York and
California consider it multiple offenses. Compare People v. Perrello, 350
Ill. 231, 182 N.E. 748 (1932), with People v. Rodgers, 171 N.Y. Supp. 451
(App. Div. 1918) and People v. Sagomarsino, 97 Cal. App.2d 92, 217 P.2d
124 (1950).
63. 356 U.S. 465 (1958). Petitioner also raised the defense of collat-
eral estoppel. He states that the sole disputed fact in the earlier trials
related to his identification as a participant and the verdict of acquittal
resolved that issue in his favor. The collateral estoppel argument is based
on basic fairness to the accused; thus, a state declining to apply the rule
in favor of a criminal defendant deprives him of due process. The Court
recognized the validity of collateral estoppel as a defense but felt it inap-
plicable as a constitutional requirement.
64. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
65. 356 U.S. at 470.
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was tried successively by three juries for each murder and sen-
tenced successively from twenty years for the wife to forty-five
years for the first child, to death for the second child. The Court
relying on Hoag held that the State was constitutionally entitled
to prosecute these individual offenses at separate trials.66
A similar sentencing technique was used in Gore v. United
States6 7 where defendant was indicted on six counts for narcotic
offenses, convicted and sentenced cumulatively on three counts for
violating three different sections of federal law by one sale of nar-
cotics. One court was for failing to fill out a treasury form on the
person to whom the drugs were sold;68 one was for selling narcotics
not on the original stamped package;6" and, the final court was for
defendant concealing the sale.7 0 Defendant filed a motion to vacate
the sentences on the grounds that only one sentence could be im-
posed for all the violations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for
the majority upheld the consecutive sentence since defendant, un-
der the statute, had committed three distinct offenses notwith-
standing the fact that the violations were compendiously commit-
ted in a single transaction.
The Court's decision in Ciucci is difficult to justify. Defendant
received a substantial imprisonment sentence in the first trial mak-
ing it appear that the subsequent trials were the result of the
prosecutor's determination to secure a death sentence regardless of
the effort necessary. 71 This would appear to be a double jeopardy
situation because of the prosecution's harassment, the inordinate
vexation and great expense to defendant. The elements indicative
of undue harassment on a defendant are the prosecutions use of
similar indictments with only defendant's name changed, his offer-
ing of similar testimony, his employment of the same theory in the
case and his contesting the same or similar facts.72 The presence of
these elements in Ciucci should have been sufficient warning to the
Court that defendant's constitutional rights were violated. Even
if the Court were not disposed to make the double jeopardy clause
obligatory on the states this would appear to have been an ideal
case for the Court to make the prosecution's conduct violative of
66. 356 U.S. at 573.
67. 357 U.S. 386 (1958). A reading of Gore reveals the Court's ap-
parent desire to aid in the prosecution of the illegal narcotics trade. In
the Court's zeal to accomplish this purpose, it could be concluded that it
ignored or aborted the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment.
Because of this possible ulterior motive, Gore's application is limited.
68. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 4705.
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 4704.
70. 2(c) of the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act, 35 Stat. 614
as amended.
71. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan concur, states in two places
that the prosecutor was not satisfied with the result and continued to press
for a death sentence verdict.
72. Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 109 (1958).
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the due process clause for such harassment shocked the conscience
of the Court.
73
The arguments advanced in the dissenting opinions in Hoag
reveal the liberal view toward double jeopardy as a defense. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren doubted that two different juries should hear
the same issue on the same evidence with a man's innocence or guilt
at stake.7 4  Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black
concurred, stated: "Since petitioner was placed in jeopardy once
and found not to have been present or a participant, he should be
protected from further prosecution for a crime growing out of the
identical facts and occurring at the same time. ' 75 Although it is
probable that this liberal approach may someday become the law,
there is also the possibility of protection to the extent that a state
may adopt the relevant provision of the Model Penal Code.76
The Code would compel the state to prosecute in one trial all of-
fenses arising out of certain situations which have led to multiple
prosecution and defense pleas of double jeopardy. Should the state
fail to join the offenses, and defendant was acquitted at the first
trial, he would be entitled to collateral estoppel under the Code.
77
WHEN DOES JEOPARDY ATTACH?
The concept that no man should be put in jeopardy before a
criminal court more than once for the same offense is necessarily
dependent upon an interpretation as to what constituted jeopardy.78
The federal courts have held that jeopardy attaches when the de-
fendant has been placed on trial before a court of competent juris-
diction with the jury duly impaneled and sworn in which de-
fendant has a valued right to go to the original jury for its verdict.79
There are, of course, situations where premature termination of
73. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1935); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,
316 (1926).
74. 356 U.S. at 475.
75. Id. at 479.
76. Model Penal Code § 1.08 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
77. Model Penal Code § 1.10 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
78. The Model Penal Code proposes that jeopardy attaches in all cases
upon the swearing of the first witness. The drafters were of the opinion
that no distinction should be made between jury and nonjury trials. Model
Penal Code § 1.08 (4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); See Model Penal Code
§ 1.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5,1956).
79. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States
v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69
(9th Cir. 1931). For a compilation of similar decision, see 22 C.J.S. Crim-
inal Law § 241 (1961).
In a nonjury case, jeopardy attaches when the court commences to
take evidence. See Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); Clawans
v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 640
(10th Cir. 1936). For a compilation of similar decisions, see 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 241 (1961).
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the trial does not bar retrials ° such as the classic example of per-
mitting a second trial in the case of a hung jury.81 Each time a
second trial was allowed, the decision to dismiss the jury was left to
the sound discretion of the judge in accordance with the decision of
United States v. Perez.82 In Perez it was held that a judge may
discharge a jury from giving a verdct when in his opinion such an
act is necessary to satisfy the ends of justice.
8 3
In 1963 the Supreme Court extended the rule that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is sworn in Downum v. United States.
8 4
Before any evidence was taken, the prosecution asked that the jury
be discharged because its key witness was not present. The judge
discharged the jury over defendant's objection. Two days later
when the case was called again and a second jury impaneled, de-
fendant pleaded former jeopardy. His plea was overruled, and he
was tried and convicted. The court of appeals affirmed on the
ground that the dismissal of the jury was within the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge in preserving the ends of justice,85 but the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The effect of Downum is
much broader than a reading of the opinion reveals. For the first
time the Justices who had been dissenting in the prior double jeop-
ardy cases were not joining in the majority opinion. The Court
could have followed either of two possible lines of cases-those
cases stating that a defendant has a right to be tried by the first
jury impaneled,8s or the decisions granting to the trial judge almost
80. See Greyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1962) (hung jury); Gore v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (improper line of questioning after
admonition by the judge); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (military
movement during time of war); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909)
(hung jury); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (disqualifi-
cation of a juror); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (hung jury);
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824) (hung jury); United States v.
Cimino, 224 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1955) (prejudiced juror); Lynch v. United
States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951) (apparent insanity of a juror); United
States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941) (illness of a juror); Blair v.
White, 24 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1928) (consent of defendant); Freeman v.
United States, 237 Fed. 815 (2d Cir. 1916) (illness of the judge); United
States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1937) (prejudicial remarks
made by the judge); United States v. Montgomery, 42 F.2d 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1930) (prejudicial articles in newspapers).
81. Dreyer v. Illinois, supra note 74; Logan v. United States, supra
note 74; United States v. Perez, supra note 74.
82. 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
83. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Cornero v.
United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931) (discharge of jury on absence of
prosecution witness); Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350, 74 P.2d 243
(1937) (mistrial for erroneous ruling on challenge); Cliett v. State, 167 Ga.
835, 147 S.E. 35 (1929) (mistrial on separation of jury before verdict);
People ex rel. Blue v. Kearney, 181 Misc. 981, 44 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
84. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
85. 300 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1962).
86. In Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931), a trial was
first continued because prosecution witnesses were not present, and when
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unlimited discretion in prematurely terminating the trial to protect
the public's interest.8 7 It favored the decisions protecting the rights
of the defendant. 88
In contrast to the cases following Perez's termination-before-
verdict rule, a determination by the jury is an absolute bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The leading case of
the after-judgment rule is Ball v. United States89 in which the
Court held that acquittal frees the defendant from any further liti-
gation of the matter at hand, even if the trial included error. A
defendant, however, who successfully attacks his conviction on ap-
peal waives his right to plead double jeopardy.9 0
The most recent application of the after-judgment rule, United
States v. Tateo,9 1 may reverse the liberal trend of Downum. De-
fendant was tried before a jury in a federal court on four counts of
bank robbery and one kidnapping count under the Federal Bank
Robbery Statute.9 2 On the fourth day of the trial, at the suggestion
of the trial judge, defendant changed his plea to guilty and the
prosecution dropped the kidnapping charge. The change of plea
was accepted, the jury dismissed, and Tateo was sentenced to twen-
ty-two years and six months in prison. Seven years later he suc-
cessfully moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that his
guilty plea had been coerced by remarks of the judge to his coun-
sel.9 3 Upon retrial defendant pleaded former jeopardy under the
they had not been found at the time the case was again called, the jury
was discharged. A plea of double jeopardy was sustained when a second
jury was selected.
87. See Gore v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), involving a de-
claration of a mistrial by the trial judge when he believed that the prose-
cuting attorney, while questioning a witness, was about to prejudice the
defendant by disclosing former crimes. The Court allowed reprosecution,
refusing to review the trial judge's use of discretion in declaring the mis-
trial.
88. The Court resolved any doubt, "in favor of the liberty of the citi-
zen, rather than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, and
arbitrary judicial discretion." 322 U.S. at 738.
89. 103 U.S. 662 (1896).
90. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900). Other cases use
the rationale that the original jeopardy continues until the case is finally
disposed of. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1903).
91. 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
92. The indictment read: Bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1958);
taking and carrying away bank money, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1958); re-
ceiving and possessing stolen bank money, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1958);
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958); and kidnapping in connection with the
robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
93. United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The
trial judge said to Tateo's counsel:
I think I ought to tell you this. If you finish the trial and
your clients are found guilty, I'm going to start off by imposing
a life sentence on the kidnapping charge and then I'm going to
add consecutive maximum sentences on the other counts on which




fifth amendment and his motion was granted with all counts dis-
missed. The district court in sustaining the defendants' former
jeopardy defense relied heavily on Downum as a termination-be-
fore-verdict case.
The United States Supreme Court applied the after-judgment
rule of Ball rather than the rule of Downum. The Court rejected
Tateo's contention that his situation was distinguishable from one
in which an accused has been found guilty by a jury, since his in-
voluntary plea of guilty deprived him of the opportunity to obtain
an acquittal verdict.9 4 It justifies its decision with the observa-
tion that if every accused were granted immunity from punish-
ment because of a defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in
the proceedings leading to conviction society would pay a high
price. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented because he felt that the ma-
jority unjustifiably limited Downum to its particular facts.95 It
is submitted that the better solution would be for Tateo to be re-
stricted to a fact situation where a judge coerces a defendant to
plead guilty and for Downum to be extended to all other termina-
tion-before-verdict and after-judgment cases.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's increasing trend to absorb the first
eight amendments into the fourteenth and the constant fight of
Justices Black and Douglas to incorporate the double jeopardy
clause itself makes it likely that the Court will be persuaded to im-
pose the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause on the states.
This will undoubtedly benefit the accused from multiple punish-
ment for the commission of a single offense in the orthodox jeo-
pardy situation. The possibility of harassment of the defendant,
the financial burden upon him and the psychological pressure of
criminal proceedings weigh heavily as factors favoring a broad
application of the double jeopardy principle.
EDWIN I. GRINBERG
94. 377 U.S. at 466.
95. Id. at 474.
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